

## Problem set 1, due Thursday, February 13<sup>th</sup>, 2014

In this problem set, you will create numerical examples of your own, to illustrate how different single-winner voting rules lead to different results. I want your examples to be grounded in the sincere preferences of imaginary voters. Then, I want you first to show how different voting rules lead to different results when votes are sincere, and second to discuss what strategic behavior might occur (if any) given each of the two rules. All of your examples should be original, i.e. not the same as examples from class or from other students. I encourage you to keep them relatively simple, by not making too many more different types of voter preferences than you have to.

1. Create an example in which plurality and runoff lead to different results.
2. Create an example in which runoff and Hare lead to different results.
3. Create an example in which approval and range lead to different results.
4. Create an example in which Hare and ranked pairs lead to different results.
5. Create an example in which Borda and ranked pairs lead to different results.
6. Create an example in which minimax and ranked pairs lead to different results.
7. Create an example in which ranked pairs and beatpath lead to different results.